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In January 1991, our nation narrowly avoided a constitutional cri-
sis, as President Bush requested and Congress passed a joint resolution
that authorized the use of military force against Iraq.1 In the weeks pre-
ceding that vote, the nation had witnessed a now-familiar dance: The
President had threatened to make war without seeking congressional
consent, Congress had avoided taking a stand, and the courts had de-
clined to enjoin an unauthorized war.2
In ways not fully appreciated by the public, Judge Harold Greene's
decision in Dellums v. Bush 3 helped break the looming impasse between
the political branches. Although Judge Greene held unripe a request by
members of Congress to enjoin an unauthorized war, he accepted two
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Ellickson, and Alan Schwartz for their insights into the Coase Theorem and other issues. This
Comment incorporates ideas developed in Harold H. Koh, Presidential War and Congressional Con-
sent: The Law Professors'Memorandum in Dellums v. Bush, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 247 (1991). The
views expressed here are mine, and are not necessarily shared by any of the other signatories to the
Memorandum Amicus Curiae of Law Professors, Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990)
[hereinafter Memorandum], reprinted in Koh, supra, at 257.
1. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-1,
105 Stat. 3 (1991), reprinted in 137 CONG. REc. S403-04 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1991) [hereinafter Iraq
Resolution]. The resolution, which was enacted by votes of 52-47 in the Senate, 137 CONG. REC.
S403 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1991), and 250-183 in the House, id. at H485, authorized the President to
use military force against Iraq, subject to substantive and procedural limits. Substantively, the reso-
lution specified that U.S. armed forces were to be used "pursuant to" and "in order to achieve
implementation of" the various United Nations Security Council Resolutions that had condemned
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Id. § 2(a). Section 2(c)(2) further declared that "[n]othing in this resolu-
tion supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution." Id. § 2(c)(2). As a procedural
precondition to using force, the Resolution required the President to determine and report to Con-
gress that all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted. Id. § 2(b). It further required the President to
report to Congress once every 60 days on the status of efforts to obtain Iraq's compliance with the
Security Council Resolutions. Id. § 3.
2. See generally HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990) (arguing that this recurrent pattern of executive
initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance pervades U.S. foreign affairs).
" 3. 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
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key claims made both by plaintiffs and in an amicus curiae memorandum
filed by a group of law professors: First, that the Constitution did not
permit the President to order U.S. armed forces to make war without
meaningful consultation with Congress and receiving its affirmative au-
thorization; and second, that the political question doctrine did not bar a
federal court from deciding that constitutional question in an appropriate
case or controversy.4 In what amounted to an unappealable declaratory
judgment against the government, Judge Greene concluded that "in prin-
ciple, an injunction may issue at the request of Members of Congress to
prevent the conduct of a war which is about to be carried on without
congressional authorization." 5 Had President Bush proceeded to wage
war without congressional authorization, he undoubtedly would have
faced scores of suits citing that proposition, brought by soldiers who
claimed (unquestionably ripe) rights not to fight and die in an unconstitu-
tional, unauthorized war.6
The eleventh-hour joint resolution averted that outcome and estab-
lished a piece of "quasi-constitutional custom" around which future in-
stitutional expectations will likely coalesce.7  All three branches
effectively acknowledged Congress's constitutional right to approve the
war. Judge Greene found that "the forces involved are of such magni-
tude and significance as to present no serious claim that a war would not
ensue if they became engaged in combat, and it is therefore clear that
congressional approval is required if Congress desires to become
involved."8 Congress's authorizing resolution expressly invoked the
War Powers Resolution 9 and the House's Bennett-Durbin Resolution
4. Compare Memorandum, supra note *, at 259, 262 (urging these positions) with Dellums,
752 F. Supp. at 1144-46 (adopting them as holdings).
5. Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1149. Judge Greene ruled against the government on all issues
except ripeness. See id. at 1149-51. As the technical victor, however, the government could not
appeal the ruling, except by cross-appeal from an appeal that plaintiffs chose not to pursue.
6. This assertion rests on the scores of inquiries I received in the days following the filing of
the memorandum from counsel for soldiers who were either resisting, or anticipating resisting, call-
ups to fight against Iraq. Cf Sidak, To Declare War, 1991 DUKE L.J. 27, 32 n.24 (citing cases
actually filed); id at 111 n.412 (agreeing that soldiers "who believed a war to be unconstitutional
could summon the courage to sue the President of the United States"). It seems plausible that the
prospect of litigating numerous unpopular post-Dellums suits was at least one factor that helped
dissuade our President from waging an unauthorized war against Iraq.
7. See KOH, supra note 2, at 70, which defines "quasi-constitutional custom" as "a set of
institutional norms generated by the historical interaction of two or more federal branches." The
customary rules that comprise this body of historical precedent "represent informal accommoda-
tions between two or more branches on the question of who decides with regard to particular foreign
policy matters." Id.
8. Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1145.
9. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1988); see Iraq Resolution, supra note 1, § 2(c)(1) ("Consistent
with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is in-
tended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War
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reaffirmed that "[a]ny offensive action taken against Iraq must be explic-
itly approved by the Congress of the United States before such action
may be initiated." 10 Most telling is that the President (despite his dis-
claimers) came to Congress and asked for its approval. 1  Thus, Iraq joins
the two World Wars and Vietnam as four of the five relevant historical
instances in this century in which the President has sought formal ap-
proval for war. 12
There things sat, satisfactorily if not happily, until J. Gregory Sidak
penned the preceding piece. 13 Although styled as a critique of those
"[w]aging [w]ar from New Haven,"'14 Sidak's article assiduously wages
war against virtually every law professor, in New Haven or elsewhere,
who took a position on the constitutionality of the looming Iraq war.
Sidak's detailed argument reduces to a curious claim: The Constitution,
political accountability, and the Coase Theorem all required Congress to
issue nothing less than a formal declaration of war against Iraq. Under
this view, the joint resolution that Congress so agonizingly enacted had
no more legal force than a letter to my mother. 15
Powers Resolution."); id, § 2(c)(2) ("Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the
War Powers Resolution.").
10. H.R. Con. Res. 32, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1991) (Bennett-Durbin Resolution), reprinted
in 137 CONG. REc. H390-01, H390-01 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1991) (reiterating that the Constitution
"vests all power to declare war in the Congress").
11. See Statement on Signing the Resolution Authorizing the Use of Military Force Against
Iraq, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 48 (Jan. 21, 1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3 (state-
ment of President Bush) ("[M]y request for congressional support did not, and my signing this
resolution does not, constitute any change in the long-standing positions of the executive branch on
either the President's constitutional authority to use the Armed Forces to defend vital U.S. interests
or the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution."); see also Speech of President Bush at
Princeton University, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRE. Doc. 590 (May 10, 1991) ("Though I felt after
studying the question that I had the inherent power to commit our forces to battle after the U.N.
resolution, I solicited congressional support before committing our forces to the Gulf war.").
12. Congress approved the two world wars by formal declaration. See S.J. Res. 1, ch. 1, 40
Stat. 1 (1917) (declaration of war against Germany in World War I); S.J. Res. 116, Pub. L. No. 77-
328, 55 Stat. 795 (1941) (declaration of war against Japan in World War II). For a persuasive
argument that at least the publicly known aspects of the Vietnam War were congressionally author-
ized, see John H. Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part 1 The (Troubled) Constitutionality of
the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 877 (1990). In Korea, the remaining example of a
large-scale, sustained war, I believe that the President committed troops unconstitutionally, but Con-
gress cured the violation almost immediately with ratifying actions. See The Constitutional Roles of
Congress and the President in Declaring and Waging War: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 10-12 (1991) (statement of Harold H. Koh).
13. Sidak, supra note 6.
14. Id. at 98.
15. See id. at 33 ("Although politically significant, Congress's joint resolution of January 12,
1991 was a legal nullity, a merely precatory or hortatory gesture."); id. ("[N]o legal significance
should attach to ajoint resolution that members of Congress have represented to be 'tantamount to a
declaration of war.' ").
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The editors of the Duke Law Journal have invited me to answer
Sidak, no doubt because he trains one barrel of his attack on the group of
law professors (whom he dubs the "Koh Signatories") with whom I filed
the amicus curiae memorandum in Dellums.16 Upon reading Sidak's ar-
ticle, I was surprised to find that, for all of his rhetorical flourishes, he
agrees with virtually every position that our memorandum adopted!
Where he does not side with us, he either misreads us 17 or his arguments
are inherently unconvincing. Let me suggest first why we ought not take
seriously Sidak's arguments regarding the constitutional requirement of a
declaration of war, and second why his ill-advised ambition to marry
constitutional originalism with law-and-economics should be killed
before it spreads.
Our memorandum argued, and Judge Greene later held, that the
political question doctrine did not bar the federal courts from deciding
issues regarding the President's authority to conduct war without con-
gressional approval.18 On this point, Sidak unambiguously sides with us,
for he "agree[s] with the Koh Signatories (and disagree[s] with President
Bush's lawyers in the Department of Justice) that it is a justiciable polit-
ical question for a federal court to determine whether armed conflict of a
certain level of ferocity constitutes 'war' for purposes of the War
Clause." 19 Similarly, we asserted (and Sidak apparently accepts) that the
President may not, absent meaningful consultation with and genuine ap-
proval by Congress, order U.S. armed forces to make war.20 Finally,
16. Sidak's other main targets are John Hart Ely (one of our number) and my colleague Ste-
phen Carter. Both are fully capable of defending themselves.
17. In one important respect, Sidak simply overreads our memorandum. Throughout his arti-
cle, he attacks us for "recommending" that the court issue injunctive relief "Circumscribing the
President's Use of Offensive Military Force." Sidak, supra note 6, at 113. Yet even a casual reading
of our memorandum shows that, as a group in Dellums, we took absolutely no position on the
appropriateness of injunctive relief, nor did we draw any distinction between offensive and defensive
uses of force. Speaking only for myself, I believe that in cases such as Dellums, courts can issue not
only declaratory judgments (a point Sidak concedes), but also injunctive relief, without triggering
Sidak's parade of horribles. All the judge need say is that an imminent likelihood of war exists
(overcoming nonripeness claims), and that the President may not conduct such a war absent the
constitutionally required congressional authorization. Notwithstanding Sidak's claims, such an or-
der would not substitute the judge for either a general or a politician. To the contrary, it would
remand the matter to political branches to do their constitutional duty. The President and his subor-
dinates would need to decide whether to go to Congress to obtain its approval or to conduct an
illegal war in the face of the court order. Cf Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500,
1531 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985) (enjoining executive
branch from conducting unlawful American military movements upon American citizen's land in
Honduras). More important, the order would force Congress to face up to its constitutional duty to
decide whether it approved the war in question.
18. See Memorandum, supra note *, at 257; Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1145-46.
19. Sidak, supra note 6, at 32.
20. See Memorandum, supra note *, at 259.
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Sidak contends that in the interests of enhancing political accountability,
Congress should manifest its approval for war with a high degree of for-
mality.21 Far from disputing that claim, our memorandum insisted "that
Congress must manifest its genuine approval through formal action, not
legislative silence, stray remarks of individual Members, or collateral leg-
islative activity that the President or a court might construe to constitute
'acquiescence' in executive acts."' 22
Where, then, do we disagree? Sidak insists that a formal declaration
of war is the only political mechanism whereby Congress may constitu-
tionally manifest its understanding and approval for a presidential deter-
mination to make war. To support this claim, Sidak invokes an odd
blend of constitutional history and Coasean economics. He draws les-
sons about political accountability from, inter alia, the 1941 declaration
of war against Japan, and concludes that declarations are thus constitu-
tionally necessary for all wars. Furthermore, using the jargon of Nobel
laureate Ronald Coase's famous theorem, 23 Sidak argues that formal dec-
larations of war are necessary to raise the "transaction costs" of going to
war, by making more difficult "Coasean trespasses"-whereby the Presi-
dent would "trespass" with impunity upon Congress's constitutionally
specified power to declare war-and "Coasean bargains"-whereby Con-
gress would "bargain away," explicitly or by acquiescence or cowardice,
its constitutional entitlement to declare war.
Sidak's first argument can be quickly dispatched. To argue that
Congress may only approve war by formal declaration makes about as
much sense these days as a claim that Congress may only approve an
international commitment by a treaty ratified by two-thirds of the Sen-
ate.24 The Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress authority to
"make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing [congressional] Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
21. See Sidak, supra note 6, at 68 ("[A]dherence to formalism in matters that affect the separa-
tion of powers, including the initiation of war, is more likely than constitutional informality and
political improvisation to produce predictability and clarity in the specification of the responsibilities
of political officials in Congress and the executive branch ....").
22. Memorandum, supra note *, at 261 (emphasis added); see also Sidak, supra note 6, at 109
(quoting this language).
23. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
24. Over time, with the blessing of all three branches, the so-called "Congressional-Executive
agreement"-an executive agreement that has been approved by joint resolution-has become
viewed as effectively interchangeable with an Article II treaty for forging our international commit-
ments. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 303 cmt. e (1987) ("The prevailing view is that the Congressional-Executive agreement can be used
as an alternative to the treaty method in every instance.").
[Vol. 41:122
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any Department or Officer thereof."' 25 In the face of this language,
Sidak's conclusion that the resolution was a "legal nullity" seems noth-
ing less than bizarre. Congress's joint resolution that authorized the Iraq
war was a duly enacted statute, passed by both houses and signed by the
President, and made for the stated purpose of authorizing use of armed
forces by the government of the United States.26 The resolution clearly
had legal force, whether one views it as carrying into execution Con-
gress's "foregoing Power" to declare war (and hence as falling within
Congress's exclusive constitutional authority), or as executing all the
powers to use military force that the Constitution vests in the two polit-
ical organs of the national government (and hence, as falling within Jus-
tice Jackson's famous "zone of twilight in which [the President] and
Congress may have concurrent authority" 27).
Sidak chides our "willingness to settle for a legislative action less
formal than a declaration" and "to disregard the most explicit formality
that the Framers devised to constrain presidential war-making-the dec-
laration of war."' 28 Yet when recounting the supposed policy advantages
of formal declarations of war-that they are bifurcated from decisions
regarding funding, handled by roll-call (not voice) vote, and less suscepti-
ble to being bundled with other legislation-he readily concedes that
"[t]he Iraq Resolution also had each of these three features."'29 As Sidak
recounts, before voting on that resolution, members of Congress were
painfully aware not only that they were voting on the functional
equivalent of a declaration of war, but also that their votes would be
intensely scrutinized. 30 Pre-vote speeches were nationally televised, and
the roll-call votes were published in every newspaper-both the next day
and during the war. Given these indicia of public accountability, it is
difficult to see what additional accountability would have been gained
had the resolution been styled as a declaration of war.
While trumpeting the advantages of formal declarations, Sidak over-
looks that "political accountability" was not the only policy value at is-
sue in the Iraq case. Declarations of war have fallen into desuetude since
World War 11,31 partly because they have substantial policy defects.
25. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).
26. See supra note 1.
27. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
28. Sidak, supra note 6, at 109.
29. Id. at 89; see also id. at 93 ("The Iraq Resolution does not differ from the declaration of war
on Japan with respect to most of these formalities, whether they be textual or customary.").
30. See sources cited in id. at 43 nn. 75-76.
1 . Congress has formally declared war only four times: the War of 1812, the Spanish-Ameri-
can War, World War I, and World War II. See GEOFFREY PERRET, A COUNTRY MADE BY WAR:
VCol. 41:122]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:122
Formal declarations are blunt instruments that do not lend themselves as
easily as joint resolutions to modulated uses of force. They tend to be
tersely worded documents, enacted hastily in crisis situations, and with
only minimal deliberation.32 They announce that a state of war exists
with an enemy, but they neither name our allies nor detail our objectives;
nor do they generally set either substantive or procedural limitations
upon the authorities being granted to the President.33 In short, formal
declarations-like meat cleavers-have their uses, but not in delicate sit-
uations that call for scalpels. To suggest that the Constitution leaves
Congress no finer options for approving uses of force smacks of mindless
originalism, the charge that some mistakenly leveled against our
memorandum. 34
I am tempted to dismiss Sidak's Coasean argument simply by sug-
gesting that the Constitution no more enacts the Coase Theorem than it
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO VIETNAM-THE STORY OF AMERICA'S RISE TO POWER 106, 280, 313
(1989); see also Ely, supra note 12, at 888 n.41 ("[S]ince World War II declarations of war have
essentially vanished, world-wide.").
32. Sidak himself notes that Congress deliberated for less than an hour before returning its
declaration of war against Japan, a document of barely 100 words. See Sidak, supra note 6, at 79.
33. Compare S.J. Res. 1, ch. 1, 40 Stat. 1 (1917) (declaration of war against Germany in World
War I) and S.J. Res. 116, Pub. L. No. 77-328, 55 Stat. 795 (1941) (declaration of war against Japan
in World War II) (granting the Presidents unlimited authority to prosecute the wars) with Iraq
Resolution, supra note 1 (circumscribing the President's power to use military force against Iraq
within the strictures of the War Powers Resolution and a 60 day reporting requirement).
34. Some have cast the recent dispute over the war powers as one between the rigid literalism of
original intent and a flexible pragmatism that views the Constitution as a living document that must
adapt to modern times. The irony, as they see it, is that some of the same scholars who urged a
flexible, evolutionary view to defend a domestic constitutional right to privacy applied a literal,
originalist reading of the War Clause when the war powers were at issue. See, e.g., W. Michael
Reisman, Some Lessons from Iraq: International Law and Democratic Politics, 16 YALE J. INT'L L.
203, 212 (1991). But as my critique of Sidak's originalism suggests, this view misses the point: The
recent war powers debate was really about constitutional structure, not text. The war powers debate
was no more confined to the narrow meaning of the War Clause than the controversies over the
constitutionality of the Gramm-Rudman Budget-Balancing Act, see Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986), and the legislative veto, see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), were confined to the Ap-
pointments or Presentment Clauses, respectively. In each case, what the Constitution required
turned not just on exegesis of particular textual snippets, but on broader inferences drawn from
structural principles of shared governmental power and checks and balances. See generally
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15 (1969);
JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 11-41, 225 n.48
(1980) (on impossibility of "clause-bound interpretivism"); KOH, supra note 2, at 68-69. Thus, the
issue in the Iraq crisis was not simply the meaning and history of the words "The Congress shall
have Power ... [t]o Declare War." U.S. CONT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. Rather, the question was how
that language and history should be viewed in light of the broader constitutional mandate that Con-
gress authorize many gradations of force (ranging from declarations of war to grants of letters of
marque and reprisal to rules concerning captures on land and sea) and the animating principle of
separated institutions sharing powers in foreign affairs. See KOH, supra note 2, at 69.
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does Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.35 But on inspection, Sidak's law-
and-economics argument carries disturbing overtones that warrant more
detailed rebuttal. The argument runs like this: In his famous article,
Coase used the example of a cattle rancher whose herd trespasses on the
territory of a neighboring farmer to demonstrate that where two parties,
inter alia, are perfectly rational, have complete knowledge, and are to-
tally free to negotiate (i.e., the costs of transacting with one another are
zero), any initial assignment of property rights to them will serve only as
the starting point for inter-party negotiations. Even if the rancher were
held legally liable for the damage done by his trespassing cattle, he and
the farmer would contract around that legal rule to the efficient result,
when the law does not create it.36
Invoking Coase, Sidak posits that "[b]y requiring formality, the
Constitution raises transaction costs and thus intentionally discourages
certain bargains that otherwise could be struck between the branches of
the federal government in the production of public goods."' 37 In layper-
son's terms, he is saying that the President is like the cattle rancher and
Congress like the farmer. On its face, the Constitution requires Congress
to declare war and the President to obtain congressional approval, and
hence assigns each institution "legal turf," but both sides have incentives
to bargain around these initial "property assignments." Congress's noto-
rious desire to escape responsibility for hard decisions and the President's
instinct to seize the initiative will lead them to avoid, through presiden-
tial trespasses or congressional bargaining, the textual allocations of re-
sponsibility specified in the Constitution. Sidak concludes that formal
declarations of war are normatively desirable because they raise transac-
tion costs, and thus make it harder for both Congress and the President
to escape their legal responsibilities through bargaining or acquiescence.
None of this is new, and could just as easily have been said without
the forced Coasean terminology. 38 Moreover, empirical studies have
identified numerous preconditions that must be met for the Coase Theo-
rem to hold; few (if any) of which apply in this situation.39 Scholars
35. Cf Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, L, dissenting) ("The Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.").
36. Coase, supra note 23, at 2-8.
37. Sidak, supra note 6, at 68.
38. For much the same argument, without the law-and-economics jargon, see KOH, supra note
2, at 153-228 (advocating new national security framework legislation to assign institutional respon-
sibility and promote political accountability, particularly with regard to war powers).
39. See, e.g., Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimen-
tal Tests, 25 J.L. & EcoN. 73, 73 (1982) (listing eight assumptions-such as "two agents to each
externality (and bargain)," "profit-maximizing producers and expected utility-maximizing consum-
ers," and "no wealth effects"--that must hold for Coase Theorem to apply).
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differ over whether Coase's theorem can be extended beyond individuals
to multiparty transactions.4° Ironically, although Sidak invokes one
branch of law-and-economics literature, he virtually ignores another-
the "public choice" literature-that gives myriad reasons why complex
institutions like Congress may not necessarily behave like individual
farmers.41 Finally, analogizing constitutional powers to "property
rights" oversimplifies to the point of distortion. As I have argued else-
where, separation of powers principles do not draw sharp boundaries be-
tween congressional and presidential authorities in foreign affairs; those
powers are generally shared, not exclusive in one branch or another.42
Most important, the Constitution bestows the power to declare war on
Congress to protect the people, and not to vest power (like property
rights) in individual members. 43
But let us put these objections to one side and assume for a moment
that Presidents are like cattle ranchers, Congress like farmers, and that
Coase's analysis does apply. If Sidak's goal is to construe the Constitu-
tion so as to raise the transaction costs of interbranch bargaining, why
are formal declarations of war necessarily superior to other formal acts
(like joint resolutions) in raising such costs? Once the Iraq Resolution
was enacted, transaction costs to bargaining away Congress's "legal
rights" became plenty high, even without taking the additional step of a
formal declaration of war. Nor, as I have already suggested, did the pub-
lic have any difficulty monitoring the votes of their elected officials.
40. See, e.g., H.E. Frech III, The Extended Coase Theorem and Long Run Equilibrium: The
Nonequivalence of Liability Rules and Property Rights, 17 ECON. INQUIRY 254, 265 (1979) (recon-
ciling the disparate views regarding the validity of the Theorem in an extended framework); Eliza-
beth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Experimental Tests of the Coase Theorem with Large
Bargaining Groups, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 149, 171 (1986) (supporting Theorem's usefulness in analyz-
ing decisions of groups of 20 persons or fewer, when bargaining, coordination, and enforcement costs
are low and few information problems exist).
41. See, eg., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimen-
sional Voting Models, 23 AM. J. POL. Sm. 27 (1979) (demonstrating how institutional structure and
individual preferences produce structure-based equilibrium); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Wein-
gast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503 (1981) (arguing
that stability in a pure majority rule system stems from a complex institutional arrangement); Barry
R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures,
Like Firms, Are Not Organized As Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132 (1988) (providing theory of legisla-
tive institutions that does not follow simple market mechanisms).
42. See KOH, supra note 2, at 69, 75-76.
43. See 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Burt Franklin 1968) (1888) (statement of James
Wilson) ("This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in
the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important
power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large...."); FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN
B. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND
LAW 214 (1986) ("The framers did not entrust the war power to Congress for the benefit of con-
gressmen; they did so for the benefit of the citizenry.").
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Finally, the joint resolution, with its various conditions and caveats, was
almost certainly more clear than a formal declaration would have been in
producing Sidak's desideratum, "predictability and clarity in the specifi-
cation of the responsibilities of political officials in Congress and the ex-
ecutive branch." 44
Why argue, then, that a formal declaration of war is constitutionally
necessary? Sidak invokes political accountability and separation of pow-
ers, but in fact his approach could easily undermine both principles. His-
tory teaches that congressional declarations of war are extraordinarily
rare.45 The crucial question thus becomes: Can the President use force
abroad unilaterally, without any form of congressional approval, in the
absence of such a declaration (i.e., in most circumstances)? At various
points, Sidak suggests (without explicitly saying so) that the President
could do so, citing the Commander in Chief power.46 But if that is so,
then our situation resembles the following quasi-Coasean parable: Sup-
pose farmers grow corn to feed the people (and thus are like Congress in
that their public role is to protect third-party beneficiaries). To prevent
their neighboring cattle rancher (i.e., the President) from letting his cat-
tle roam over their property with impunity (i.e., taking us regularly to
war without congressional consent), territorial boundaries (viz., constitu-
tional rules regarding congressional approval) should presumably be
strictly enforced. Suppose local law specifies that when a majority of the
farmers and the cattle rancher agree (i.e., a joint resolution), the cattle
can roam in limited, specified areas. Suppose, however, that in the name
of greater formality, a judge finds such agreements to be "legal nullities"
and decides that the law in fact requires a more extraordinary expression
of farmer approval for such actions (expressed only four times in local
history). He further finds, as Sidak would, that farmers may not obtain
injunctions to stop unauthorized cattle wanderings.47 The result, of
course, is that such cattle wanderings will increase, not decrease, and
more, not fewer, crops will be destroyed. Some farmers may abhor that
result, but now lack the political wherewithal or the judicial tools to stop
it; other farmers may not mind, or, more likely, will acquiesce in this
outcome because the rancher is their close friend and protector.
The point is that Sidak's rule in fact undercuts political accountabil-
ity because it plays into the convergent incentives of both President and
Congress to "let George do it." If rarely obtained declarations of war
were the only occasions for approving wars, then the President would
44. Sidak, supra note 6, at 68; see also supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
45. See supra note 31.
46. See Sidak, supra note 6, at 54-56, 113-14.
47. See supra note 17.
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gain greater freedom to use force abroad without the need for congres-
sional consent in "situations short of war," while Congress would gain
yet another excuse for not going on the record regarding the President's
conduct (namely, "the danger is not sufficiently clear or present to justify
a declaration of war"). The irony is that in the name of protecting the
original allocation of constitutional authorities, Sidak's "more formal"
rule (coupled with his ban on injunctions) would permit a major realloca-
tion of those authorities. Thus, far from enforcing a system of separation
of powers, Sidak's rule would undercut it by broadening the President's
de facto authority to conduct unauthorized wars. If the goal is to pre-
vent the President from involving us in wars without congressional ap-
proval, then the costs of obtaining congressional approval should be
lowered-not raised. By insisting on a formal declaration of war Sidak
would raise the costs to Congress of expressing its views, and, thus, widen
the sphere of uncontrolled executive discretion.
In sum, the world would have been better off had Sidak simply sided
with us completely. Had he done so, formal declarations of war would
have been left to their special historical place, the Coase Theorem left to
its other domains, and the meat cleaver left in the kitchen drawer, where
it belongs.
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